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1. Introduction 
This paper argues that, in conditions of globalisation and of the commodification of 
scientific knowledge production, conventional approaches to understanding 
innovation based on the analysis of national system are inadequate and require 
extension and development. Freeman first authoritatively articulated the National 
Innovation System (NIS) concept in 1987 when he analysed Japanese economic 
performance (Freeman 1987). Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) further developed 
the concept and their work became the standard referenc s.  More recently, attempts 
have been made to apply the NIS approach to the study of economies in the 
developing world, particularly the African countries (e.g. Muchie et al. 2003).  
 
The NIS perspective emphasises the identification, in any given economic setting, of 
both the interactions between significant social-economic variables and the dynamic 
co-evolution of institutions and technologies which together impact to produce key 
development features and dynamics. In other words, NIS focuses on the existence of 
collections of national systems, operating within multilateral international etworks. 
Such conceptualisations are products of national policy studies approaches. As such, 
they pose problems in understanding various developments within nation states which 
are products of more recent globalisation processes.    To address this latter-day 
deficiency this paper adopts a wholly different pers ctive, paying greater regard to 
the fact that knowledge formation and innovation occur in the interconnected 
conditions of both the commodification of scientific knowledge production and 
globalisation.  
 
The accelerating commodification of scientific knowledge production is a widely 
discussed phenomenon (e.g. Baskaran and Boden 2006). ‘Globalisation’ is also well-
theorised (e.g. Appadurai 2001) and can be distinguished from national, international 
and multinational trends in a number of ways. First, globalisation involves the 
compression of time and space. Second, it generates wholesale flows of, amongst 
other things, people, capitals, information and knowledge. Third, national 
sovereignties are transcended as national geographic boundaries/territorialities are 
breached in a variety of ways. And finally, although globalisation involves an intense 
level of homogenisation of techniques, policies and practices, these cause local 
disjunctures at their incidence. This creates dissonance between the global and the 
local. 
 
These more general characteristics of globalisation have impacted upon knowledge 
production. This is an inevitability given the centrality of the commodified knowledge 
product of science in globalised ‘knowledge economies’. For instance, information 
and communication technologies along with globalised corporate organisational forms 
and practices make it commonplace for scientists to work instantaneously across 
national boundaries in infinitely flexible ways. Science is now marked by rapid global 
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flows of information, data, knowledge and skills (including the people who embody 
them). As science becomes increasingly commodified (an  hence privatised) so it is 
disassociated from national institutions and policy making interests/control. Finally, 
knowledge practices have varying local impacts in terms of social change and 
development – knowledge inflows to any country may c use local disjunctures in, for 
instance, labour markets, income levels and resource allocation. 
 
Globalisation implies the loss of local control over knowledge capital, the movement 
of laboratories and people across national territorial boundaries, the development of 
intellectual property rights regimes attuned to global not local needs and a movement 
away from the focus of science on local needs. In many senses, global flows of 
knowledge capital are analogous to the globalisation of financial capital, with similar 
consequences and dis/advantages. 
 
These developments suggest that there is a need for an enhanced model beyond that 
offered by the NIS approach. We argue for a model based on the concepts of 
governance, commodification and globalisation.  Our model explicates the lines of 
tension inherent in this new world regime. We argue that the primary fault-lines are 
not between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ or the North and the South. Rather, they are 
between competing national interests on one side an globalised actors (particularly 
multinational corporations) seeking to maximise their advantage on the other. 
 
This paper is organised into five further sections. I  section 2, which follows, we 
briefly rehearse the NIS concept. In sections 3 and 4 we detail how the 
commodification of scientific knowledge production a d globalisation problematise 
NIS approaches. In section 5 we tentatively propose a model that captures these 
developments better. This is followed by some conclusions. 
 
 
2. The National System of Innovation (NIS) Approach 
The origins of NIS approaches can be traced to Friedrich List’s (1856) concept of the 
’national production system’ (Freeman 1995).  The innovation system concept has 
subsequently evolved and been deployed to address different problems and areas. NIS 
has been defined by Patel and Pavitt as  
 
The national institutions, their incentive structures and their competencies, that 
determine the rate and direction of technological learning ...in a country 
(1994:12) 
 
Freeman describes NIS as the way ‘resources are managed and organised’ in the 
pursuit of acquiring certain technological capabilities, possibly enabling a country 
with  
 
rather limited resources ... to make very rapid progress ... [but] weaknesses in 
the national system of innovation may lead to more abundant resources being 
squandered by the pursuit of inappropriate objectivs or the use of ineffective 
methods. (Industry Commission, Australia 1995:69).  
 
Nelson and Rosenberg (1993:4) define NIS very broadly s the set of institutions and 
factors whose interactions determine national technological capabilities.  They argue 
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that, in spite of many common features between the systems of the countries with 
more or less equal economic development, there are also very significant differences 
attributable to ‘national histories and cultures including the timing of a country’s entry 
into the industrialisation process’ which influence the evolution of the institutions, 
laws and policies (1993:18). Put simply, NIS encompasses the institutional structures 
and systems of incentives that evolve as a direct consequence of socio-economic, 
political and technical factors (Figure 1). 
 
In other words, NIS suggests that the national innovati n systems evolve differently 
because of a range of different factors in heterogeneous countries.  Hence, the rate and 
direction of technological accumulation will vary across countries as this is contingent 
upon the nature of the local innovation system.   This explains ‘why the national 
system of innovation has worked better in certain environments than in others’ (Katz 






























Muchie and Baskaran take a more radical view and argue that 
 
the system of innovation is a concept utilised to describe the relationship 
between internal processes in firms and external processes in the wider 
environment in the context of knowledge creation, diffusion, and transfer… 
within the context of the global market/economy.  (2006:31) 
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Figure 1: Major Elements of National Innovation System (NIS)
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They go on 
 
the innovation system concept makes central, institutions, histories, territories, 
technologies, organisations and nations that are often neglected and treated as 
a residual in mainstream neo-classical economics. The concept has evolved by 
putting innovation and learning at the heart of the economics of development. 
(2006:33). 
 
Indeed, they argue, the national innovation system  
 
is not just a tool to achieve the narrow goal of industrial/economic 
competitiveness, but it is about achieving a broader development and wider 
social benefits. (2006:33) 
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Socio-economic Objectives










Thus, whilst the mainstream NIS approach is helpful in understanding how various 
actors in a national setting interact and shape the way capabilities are built, it does not 
necessarily capture fully all actors and may exclude those external to the nation state 
in the globalised world such as intellectual property regimes under the WTO, 
transnational corporations, and non-governmental organisations and campaign groups 
(domestic and international). In particular, traditional NIS approaches may 




3. Commodification of Knowledge, States and Economies 
In this section we argue that processes of the commodification of knowledge, within 
neoliberal ideological state regimes, have had a profound effect on national 
innovation systems. Because science is a social practice, science knowledge products 
cannot exist independently from the processes that make and shape them.  
 
At the times when the NIS approach was first formulated rather traditional scientific 
practices, relationships between science and innovation and notions of the role of 
government prevailed. Nearly all science was practised within ‘the sphere of human 
activities’ identified as the independent ‘Republic of Science’ by Dasgupta and David 
(1994:487), following Polanyi. Under the traditional model (see Figure 3) of scientific 
knowledge production, the practice of science is discrete, independent and objective.  
Its function is to produce codified open knowledge that might be economically useful, 
but could equally have some general, civilising, effect or be useful in government. 
Scientific knowledge (in fundamental distinction from technology) is not commodity 
to be economically traded. Rather, in the gift economy of knowledge, scientists 
receive specific rewards unrelated to the economic usefulness in return for the gift of 
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It is via the process of ‘innovation’ that the gift of knowledge was expected to flow 
from the (independent) realm of science to the world f (commercial) technological 
development and exploitation. According to Rose and Rose  
 
…innovation depends on a process whereby science continu usly transforms 
and informs technology. (1969:8) 
 
Of course, not all science could lead demonstrably, either in the short or long term, to 
technological outputs. Nor was it always possible to discern at the outset which 
scientific knowledge products would prove useful in the development of technology. 
Implicit here was a separation of science and technology, reified by a division of 
labour between scientists and technologists.  
 
Thus, the exploitation of scientific knowledge for commercial benefit took place away 
from the realm of science. Indeed, much of the writing on science and science policy 
from the 1850’s to the 1980’s praised Britain’s scient fic knowledge production whilst 
bemoaning the inability of “industry” utilise that knowledge by turning it into 
profitable technology through innovation (see, for example, Wiener, 1981).  Under 
such a model, government both accepts a responsibility for funding science and 
derives useful knowledge from it. Scientific knowledg  products are public or merit 
goods.  
 
The past two decades in many states are marked by fundamental ideological changes 
in regimes of government as neoliberal approaches have taken hold. In a subtle 
contradistinction to classical liberal regimes, neoliberal states see their role as 
proactively supporting and sustaining the private, w alth-generating, sector whilst 
running themselves as economically, efficiently and effectively as possible by 
emulating private sector practices and employing their techniques and technologies 
(Rose 1996; Dean 1999). Thus the public realm becam much more like the private in 
its ethos and practices, shifting its focus to supporting and facilitating the private 
sector rather than simply withdrawing to let it have free reign. An important aspect of 
this shift has been the steady dissolution or attrition of the dichotomous divide 
between the public and private realms.   
 
In neoliberal states, science has been reconceptualised in various ways congruent with 
this political ideology (Nedeva and Boden 2006). Perhaps uniquely in the history of 
science, the development of the ‘knowledge economies’ and the burgeoning of 
neoliberal states have generated new exogenous policy-led pressures for change in the 
vision, institutions and practices of science (Boden, Cox and Nedeva 2006; Nedeva 
and Boden 2006).  The role of the interventionist neoliberal state is now to ensure that 
science is sufficiently integrated directly into the innovation process to ensure 
immediate payback for investment in science. This is a change that fundamentally 
changes the dynamics of any national innovation system, yet one that is usually 
presented as nothing more than seeking greater synegies and efficiencies. 
 
Science has become a commodity to be traded and exchanged for profit and the 
principal commodity in the rapidly expanding global free market ‘knowledge 
economies’. Scientific knowledge, rather than being a gift, is ascribed a value, 
exchanged and made subject to regimes of ownership and/or control. Consequently, 
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the imperative for scientific knowledge production is increasingly becoming the 
capacity of such knowledge to create economic wealth through trading in the 
knowledge economy (Baskaran and Boden 2006).  If science knowledge production 
embodies commodification, we reason, then the resulting knowledge product will 
reflect that commodification (Law and Akrich 1994). 
 
A consequence of this is the besieging of the Independent Republic of Science by 
interventionist national science policies driven by the desire to limit the less publicly 
acceptable aspects of science, to curb science budgets and to direct scientific work 
towards explicit commercial ends (Dasgupta and David 1994).  In other words, 
neoliberal leaning governments in many developed an developing countries have 
designed their national science policies to push academic and public R&D much 
closer to the private sector.  
   
These changes are illustrated by the shift in public funding of R&D in the UK.  Table 
1 and Figure 4 illustrate the changes in the public R&D funding pattern over the last 
10-15 years. Table 1 clearly shows a decline in the ov rall government funding of 
public/academic R&D in the UK, from over £3bn in 1992 to less than £1.3bn by 
2002.  At the same time, funding by business of public/academic R&D has increased, 
but fluctuates, increasing from £372m in 1993 to £571m in 2000 but the declining to 
445m in 2002.  This trend is also seen in the case of funding from non-European 
Union overseas sources to the non-business sector in he UK.3  This increased from 
£176m in 1992 to £426m in 2002.  Taken together, both usiness and non-EU funding 
of public/academic R&D has increased from £548m in 1992 to 871m in 2002. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates government and business funding trends between 1992 and 2002.  
Government funding fell sharply between 1994 and 1995 and declined steadily since.   
It is also clear from Table 1 that the government funding to Research Councils has 
seen little increase and the funding to Higher Education sharply fell from £1801m in 
1994 to £161m in 1995.  It has only marginally increased during 1999 and 2000 
(£258m and £266m respectively) and has declined since then.  Of late, the UK 
government has made attempts to increase public sector investment in science and 
technology research, but this comes with heavy strings attached with regards to 
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Government and Business Funding of Public/Academic R&D in the UK 
between 1992 and 2002 (in £ millions) 
 



























Funding  to 
Public 
R&D 
1992 1540 -- 1493 3033 207 -- 165 372 1212 128 500 
1993 1633 -- 1602 3235 214 -- 176 390 1261 205 595 
1994 1742 -- 1801 3543 196 -- 157 353 1347 266 619 
1995 1306 83 161 1550 105 36 170 311 1645 278 589 
1996 1317 77 157 1551 129 35 188 352 1887 299 651 
1997 1166 78 161 1405 203 37 205 445 1692 321 766 
1998 1172 76 177 1425 260 38 221 519 2119 355 874 
1999 1083 78 258 1419 308 48 242 598 2433 343 941 
2000 1138 102 266 1506 287 35 259 581 2369 366 947 
2001 937 148 237 1322 191 37 250 478 2903 363 841 
2002 863 150 249 1262 152 36 257 445 3390 426 871 
Source: Baskaran and Boden (2006a)      
 
These figures are based on current price.  However, th y provide significant trends 
and they do not diminish the relevance of various trends analysed below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Government and Business Funding of Public R&D in the UK 
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These interventions have resulted in the actual or virtual relocation of science from its 
discrete ‘Republic’ to positions firmly within or under the hegemonic control of the 
public and private sectors. This relocation was achieved through the commodification 
of the knowledge product of science and has fundamentally altered the social practice 
of science, disrupting the traditional social contrac  between scientists and the public 
under which science produced open, codifiable and trusted knowledge. Figure 5 
illustrates the new model. 
 
We argue here the production of open and codified knowledge wanes as scientific 
knowledge (and the knowledge production process) is transformed into a commodity 
owned and controlled by those seeking to exploit it. Scientists’ rewards are no longer 
social status and position, but rather are financial and commensurate with the 
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Figure 5: The emerging new model for science in the UK 
in the 21st century






The implications for NIS are clear: the state has adopted a much more interventionist 
role to relocate science in an attempt to ensure that i  is a seamless part of the 
innovation process. As part of that process, science has been commodified and, 
effectively, privatised. When combined with the processes of globalisation, this can 
have dramatic effects on the dynamics of national systems of innovation and 
emphasise the need for revisiting the NIS concept. 
 
 
4. Globalisation, Commodification and Emergence of New Governance 
Globalisation coupled with the information technology revolution has generated 
global fast-flows of financial capital, trade, information, skills, jobs, and knowledge 
capital. It has commensurately restricted significantly the autonomy of nation states 
and undermined their ability to control and manage socio-economic development 
dynamics.  For example, the business process outsourcing (offshoring) has led to a 
migration of jobs and knowledge capital, mostly from developed countries to 
developing countries. Governments in these developed countries such as Germany, 
the UK and the US are almost helpless to prevent this yet face strong criticisms from 
local politicians, trade unions and the press.  Notonly less skilled jobs such as call 
centres, but also high value-added activities such as R&D, engineering and design, 
knowledge processing and logistics have migrated from OECD to developing 
countries, such as India, due to the availability of abundant cheap scientific and 
technical talent and good quality services.  Exacerbating this, a large number of 
science and technology departments in universities ar  being closed in countries such 
as the UK due to rapidly declining student demand.  These developments have the 
potential to create socio-economic instability in developed countries.  This new 
phenomenon is an example of how globalisation has trown up serious challenges to 
governments and their national systems of innovations not only in the developing 
world but also in the developed countries.  
 
Globalisation is, unsurprisingly, increasingly seen as 
 
a definite marker of a new crisis for sovereignty of nation-states, even if there 
is no consensus on the core of this crisis or its generality and finality” 
(Appadurai 2001:4).   
 
Globalisation has not had homogenous outcomes across s cieties, countries, or 
regions.   The flow or movement of finance capital, knowledge capital, and 
information are not same or spatially consistent and their pattern varies due to 
differences in local (national) institutional struct res.  It is argued that 
The present system of global governance favours the ric  and powerful – the large 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and rich and powerful nation state (particularly the 
USA). The poor and the weak (mostly in low-income countries) are placed at a 
considerable disadvantage, due to the continuing trade discriminations against their 
export products; existing restrictions on the cross-border movement of low-skilled 
labour; the creation of ‘intellectual property rights’ that severely restricts the flow of 
knowledge, ideas and technology; and, finally, the severe undersupply of such global 
public goods such as peace, security, equity, healt, a healthy global natural 
environment, and knowledge (Storm and Rao 2004:567). We now consider three 
issues that demonstrate how globalisation may affect national systems of innovation: 
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foreign direct investment, intellectual property rights and corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
This is clearly seen from the trends and patterns of internationalisation of R&D 
through foreign direct investment (FDI). Increasingly FDI is seen as vital by 
developing countries for employment creation, increasing exports and foreign 
exchange earnings, technology spillovers and knowledge capital formation to the 
benefit of the host economy.  However, studies reveal mixed results about the 
technological benefits of FDI to host economies.  While some identified positive 
technology spillovers, others found little or negative effects.   It is also argued that 
publication bias towards studies finding positive technology spillovers by academic 
journals may have presented a distorted picture (Balasubramanyam and Mahambare 
2003:18).  Therefore, while attracting FDI is perceived to be an important way to 
accumulate new knowledge and technology by nation state , it may not lead to 
intended results for two reasons:  
 
(i) foreign firms are unlikely to voluntarily transfer their technology and 
know-how as they would like to have monopoly over them;  
(ii)  the host economy may not have the capability (including R&D and skills) 
to absorb and benefit from FDI.    
 
In such condition, FDI may prove to be a double edge sword.  While it may bring in 
some benefits, it may also prove to be detrimental to building indigenous capabilities.  
A study by OECD (2002) highlights both costs and benefits from FDI for host 
countries, pointing out that apart from a loss of plitical sovereignty, some countries 
could fail to witness benefits such as transfer of technology and knowledge, and 
human capital formation.  Various studies suggest that not only the volume and nature 
of FDI flow varies greatly across the emerging and less developed economies, but 
also their ability to absorb and benefit from them and enhance their national 
productive systems varies greatly (e.g. OECD 2002; Wei 2005; Chakraborty and Basu 
2002; Rajan 2005).  
 
For example, there has been significant growth in the globalisation of R&D and 
foreign investment in R&D in India has grown significantly.  Beginning in the area of 
information technology, it has spread to automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and 
biotechnology sectors.  Some multinational companies (MNCs) have also opened 
their own R&D centres and others have joined hands with Indian firms and 
organisations.  More than 100 MNCs have established R&D facilities in India 
(UNCTAD 2005).  More and more high-tech firms, especially makers of 
microprocessors, are investing in R&D in Bangalore, India. US chipmaker AMD 
recently announced it will invest at least 5 million dollars in setting up a design 
facility in Bangalore that will employ Indian engineers.  Other chipmakers Intel and 
Texas Instruments also set up design centres in Bangalore (See Website A). 
 
Motorola's two research and development facilities in India helped produce a sub-
US$40 cellular phone for emerging markets. Microsoft launched its third international 
research centre in India in 2005. Intel has 800 India-based engineers working on 
software and hardware designs for its communication and semiconductor product 
lines. Other U.S. companies are designing everything from auto parts to consumer 
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electronics in India through outsourcing or setting up their own facilities. These 
developments are considered just the beginning of advanced research and 
development in India and they are expected to lead to basic research and product 
innovation in the future.  
 
However, much of the R&D in India is geared toward smaller projects that 
complement other innovation centres in Silicon Valley and elsewhere in the world  
(See Website B).  Also, most of this R&D appears to be focused on problem solving 
for developed markets abroad rather than the domestic one.  Although this may 
change in future, it poses a challenge for the NIS in India and the government as to 
how manage and integrate transnational R&D with the national system of innovation 
and production and derive benefit for the national economy.  
 
On the positive side, globalisation of R&D investment has created skilled jobs in 
India, and it is possible that it may have some spillover effect in the long-term and the 
some Indian contract research organisations may emerge as manufacturers themselves 
(Mani 2006).   On the negative side, they have contributed to the marginalisation of 
R&D in traditional technologies (Bowonder 2001).  
 
While the experience of India in benefiting from FDI in the areas of technology and 
know-how transfer and formation of human capital is mixed with some benefits and 
some negative impacts, the experience of another major developing country Brazil 
appears to be very different. Since 19960s and until major liberalisation of its 
economy in the 1990s under the pressure of globalisation, Brazil made a strong effort 
to build indigenous technological capabilities in different areas of its national 
economy.  The government invested heavily in building the science and technology 
infrastructure and skilled human resources.   Although FDI and MNCs were allowed 
in some sectors such as automobile industry, their role was small and limited in the 
local economy.  As a result of this policy approach by the end of 1980s Brazil had 
developed strong indigenous technological capabilities in a number of sectors such as 
space, computer, telecommunications and agro-industry.  In these sectors government 
policies protected the local firms from foreign competition to make production rooted 
in the local innovation system.  
 
Since the early 1990s, Brazil has taken steps to liberalise its economy to attract and 
increase FDI inflow to encourage local innovations, R&D investment, technology and 
knowledge transfer by the foreign companies.   This policy led to significant increase 
in FDI inflow – it increased 13 fold in the 1990s compared to that of 1970s.  During 
this time, a number of state owned companies were d-regulated and privatised.  The 
state funding of public R&D institutions and development of skilled human resources 
witnessed a sharp decline.  These developments led to significant changes in the 
national innovation system.  Significant increases in inflows of FDI did not lead to 
significant increase in technology spillovers and knowledge transfers in Brazil’s 
national economy (Cassiolato et al. 2006).  On the contrary, Cassiolato and others 
argue that: 
 
The indigenous technological capabilities acquired through decades of hard 
work are being eroded.  The new FDI was most market-se king and directed 
to acquisition of existing firms rather than green field investment. MNC’s 
subsidiaries acquired important R&D-intensive local firms (in biotech, 
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computers, telecom and auto parts, for example) and downgraded their 
technology efforts.  In short, the national innovation system (which continues 
to be lopsided) is going through a major change in its characteristics 
(2006:53). 
 
These examples clearly highlight uncertainties and complexities created by 
globalisation in acquiring technology and knowledge capital through FDI.   
 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Another clear example of the erosion of nation state ’ autonomy can be illustrated by 
the World Trade Organisation’s patent rules governing trade related intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS) and the global dominance of small number of pharmaceutical 
corporations.  In the pharmaceutical industry, perhaps above all others, scientific 
knowledge is an absolutely essential commodity. Whilst scientific research and 
development on drugs i highly speculative and costly, there is also evidence that the 
global pharmaceutical companies effectively deploy these arguments in support of 
their pricing policies in situations where these factors are not significant. This serves 
to artificially escalate the price of new drugs. The drug companies also pursue ‘market 
segmentation’ pricing policies, fixing the price of their drugs at different levels in 
different countries, irrespective of actual production costs. 
  
Global trade in pharmaceuticals is effectively contr lled through the World Trade 
Organisation’s patent rules governing trade related intellectual property rights — 
TRIPS.  These rules are mainly aimed at protecting MNCs that invest substantially in 
developing new products and technologies and it is argued that such protection would 
enable them to invest and move their operations to developing countries and that will 
benefit their economies through technology spillovers.  While theoretically it should 
work like this, in practice it is more complex.  Let us consider the case of South 
Africa’s attempt to provide HIV/AIDS drugs cheaply for its population to 
demonstrate this complexity and the problem of multinational pharmaceutical 
corporations’ control over scientific intellectual property. 
 
Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS provide certain exceptions to patent rights and they do 
theoretically allow countries to procure drugs from cheap sources, that is, to make 
‘parallel imports’ or to make generic versions under ‘compulsory licensing’ in cases 
of national emergency (WTO). However, what constitutes a national emergency is a 
moot point. In general, individual states have their own national legislation which 
permits the setting aside of TRIPS in certain circumstances. In practice, TRIPS can be 
used effectively to ban countries from buying medicines from cheap sources.  This 
became evident when South Africa tried to resort to this provision in TRIPS.   
 
Due to the high cost, only a tiny minority of the population in developing countries 
can afford drugs to treat HIV/AIDS.  Faced with a serious HIV/AIDS problem and an 
inability to procure patent-protected drugs on the world market due to prohibitive 
pricing, the South African government tried to use th national emergency clause in 
TRIPS to procure cheap generic drugs from alternate sources such as India. Alarmed 
by this development, 39 pharmaceutical companies, including large multinational 
companies such as GlaxoSmithKline, Merck & Co. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Roche, and 
Boehringer Ingelheim, and acting under the banner of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA), filed a lawsuit against the government of South Africa for 
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violating their patent rights.  These multinational companies are a powerful global 
force, with a combined market capitalisation ten times greater than South Africa’s 
GNP (The Independent 19 April 2001).   
 
The case drew worldwide attention and generated a strong public outcry.  Non-
governmental organisations such as Oxfam and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) 
warned of worldwide demonstrations against ‘the callousness and bullying’ of the 
drug multinationals (The Independent 5 March 2001).  Citizens resorted to street 
protests in several South African cities led by a well-organised South African lobby 
group, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).  TAC filed an affidavit in which 
leading industry researchers swore that a third of life saving drugs developed by 
pharmaceutical companies in the US received significant amount of government 
funding.  TAC argued that the R&D cost for all five of the main anti-AIDS drugs had 
been met by American universities or by the US National Institute for Health (NIH), 
not the drug companies.  It was argued that the drug companies had deliberately 
underplayed the role of public institutions such as the NIH in developing new drugs.    
 
These arguments seriously undermined the drug companies’ case, in which they 
consistently asserted that these drugs were developed following huge private 
investment.  The World Health Organisation and the media in the US and Europe 
strongly also criticised the action of the drug companies and it soon became clear that 
even if they had won in the court, the global negative publicity would have serious 
commercial consequences.  
 
The pharmaceutical firms eventually withdrew their case and subsequently, the 
British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, which had vehemently opposed 
the South African Government’s decision to procure ch ap generics, gave a voluntary 
license on its patents to Aspen Pharmacare, a South African manufacturer of generic 
drugs.  Although drug companies were apparently routed, withdrawing their case and, 
in many instances, selling their patented medicines at discounted prices to developing 
nations, the long-term benefit to these countries is till ambiguous.  For example, a 
study by an UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (2001) while 
highlighting some benefits of TRIPs to India, also acknowledged that the 
strengthening of patenting will affect Indian pharmceutical (price and growth) and 
biotechnology industries.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Globalisation has constrained the autonomy of natio states and their ability to 
regulate, control, manage, and influence all aspect of economic activities including 
science knowledge production and transfer, and multinational corporations.  This has 
led to the emergence of new actors and governance me hanisms both at national and 
international levels.  Grassroots protest movements, campaign groups, and non-
governmental organisations have emerged to fill this void putting pressure both on 
nation states and multinational organisations such as World Bank, IMF, G8, WTO, 
and corporations. For example, the non-government organisations such as Oxfam and 
Christian Aid have started championing the cause of developing world in the areas 
such as debt burden, agricultural subsidies in the developed countries and HIV/AIDS 
drugs.  Non-governmental organisations, interest groups, and new mechanisms are 
emerging as a counter weight to increasingly powerful corporate actors as states are 




Until recently industry, and particularly the big corporations, had been operating on 
the basis that the point of being in business was to make profit, with little or no regard 
to the social or environmental costs or responsibilities.  But since the mid 1990s, the 
global community has been increasingly critical of this attitude, particularly when 
industry started commercially exploiting new sciencs such as genetic engineering 
and biotechnology whilst frequently disregarding the health, moral, and 
environmental consequences. The public came to distrust not only industry but also 
science itself and government scientific advisors in many countries have come to be 
perceived as agents of big corporations – which indeed, under conditions of 
neoliberalism, they often are.  The commodification of scientific knowledge led to a 
number of controversies such as those over genetically modified organisms, 
HIV/AIDS drugs, mobile phone radiation, and intellectual property rights affecting 
the developing world (TRIPS/WTO). Such opposition played a major role in framing 
debates on corporate social responsibilities.  Thisappears to have forced a rethinking 
about the role of the industry in a wider society, that is, the corporate social 
responsibility to the society apart from the traditional responsibility to the share 
holders. Also, in the face of a declining power equation between nation states and 
corporations, the notion of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), has emerged and 
took a concrete shape since the late 1990s.  The evolution of CSR in the UK is an 
interesting case. 
 
Until 1995 the concept of social responsibility was given only a little importance in 
the corporate governance debate in the UK.   Neither  corporations nor the 
governments took the concept of corporate social responsibility seriously until mid-
1990s. However, a major change started following the failure of the effort by Shell to 
dump the Brent Spar oil rig in the North Sea in 1995 due to a strong public outcry and 
the consequent financial impact on the company from consumer boycotts.  
Subsequently, facing a strong criticism by campaign groups and some of its own 
shareholders over the Brent Spar affair, and its controversial role in Nigeria connected 
with environmental issues and human rights, Shell was forced to publish the first 
corporate social report by a company in the UK in 1998 showing its social and 
environmental performance.   
 
Earlier in 1997, due to increasing consumer criticism of the exploitative conditions 
under which the goods they sell were produced in the developing countries, some 
corporations including Reebok, Toys’R’Us, Avon, Body Shop and Sainsbury decided 
to support a verifiable code of conduct called Social Accountability 8000 – an 
initiative by the Council on Economic Priorities, an American public interest group 
(The Independent 26 October 1997).   However, many corporations remained 
unwilling to take social responsibility seriously.  For example, according to Mark 
Moody-Stuart, the chairman of Shell UK, when the Shell decided to publish a 
corporate social report, other large international corporations were dismayed and told 
it ‘you must be out of your tiny heads’ (Financial Times 19 January 1998).  Even in 
1998 many corporate managers perceived corporate social responsibility as ‘a 
nebulous concept which has little relevance beyond public relations (The Guardian 13 
June 1998).   
 
However, by the late 1990s the leading multinationals such as BP, IBM, British 
Telecom, Levis, Nike, Kodak and Monsanto were forced to take CSR seriously due to 
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pressure from the public and non-governmental organisations such as Green Peace, 
Oxfam, Amnesty International, and Christian Aid.  Particularly, the US giant 
Monsanto’s effort to commercialise genetically modified food and crops led to wide-
spread public protest and boycott in Europe due to serious concerns over health and 
safety.  Supermarkets were forced to remove GM products from their shelves and 
governments were forced to set a moratorium on GM crops.  In this process, 
Monsanto lost significant public trust, leading to serious financial repercussions for 
the company.  In February 1999, a Mori poll in the UK has found that the approval 
ratings of corporate world was at a 30-year low and two-third majority of those 
surveyed felt that corporations paid ‘too little attention to their social and 
environmental responsibilities’ (The Guardian 18 March 1999).    
 
Fearing consumer backlash, leading corporations were fo ced to take CSR more 
seriously.  For example, a survey in Europe in 1998 revealed that 70 per cent of 
businesses believed that ‘corporate social responsibility’ has become an important 
business issue.  In 1999, a survey of 98 of the FTSE 100 companies (UK) by Pensions 
and Investment Research Consultants found that 79 of them reported in some way on 
social and community issues and 14 of them produced dedicated social reports (The 
Observer 27 June 1999).  In April 1999, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), an organisation formed in the run-up to the Rio Earth 
Summit of 1992 to generate a positive business response to the environmental 
challenges the summit was addressing, published a rport declaring ‘CSR is firmly on 
the global policy agenda’.  This showed how rapidly the agenda for CSR has 
expanded outside the boundary of public donations and environmental issues since 
early 1990s.  By 2001 the big corporations in Europe initiated an ‘action plan’ for a 




These three developments and examples illustrate the effects of globalisation on 
national systems of innovation and highlight the ned for new conceptual model for 
knowledge capital in the globalised world.  We attempt to develop such a model in the 
next section. 
 
5. Knowledge Capital and Globalisation: New Conceptual Model 
Figure 6 introduces a conceptual model of knowledge capital in the globalised world.  
It illustrates the complex nature of knowledge accumulation process in the globalised 
world and highlights how globalisation has created problems for national systems of 
innovation in both developed and developing countries, some similar and some 
dissimilar.  Similar problems include pressures from privatisation and 
commodification of science knowledge production and ownership resulting in public 
scepticism of science and protests from local grassroot  organisations and campaign 
groups. While national systems of innovation in developed countries are facing the 
problem of skilled job migration, their counterparts in developing countries are facing 
skilled worker migration.  Developing countries are facing disadvantages caused by 
WTO-TRIPS regime, and the complexities involved in managing and benefiting from 
FDI associated technical spillovers and knowledge flow.  With some exceptions, such 
as the South East Asian countries, China and India, many countries appear to be not in 
a position to benefit greatly from FDI flows in terms of accumulating knowledge 
capital.  Although some of these problems or factors such as the ability/ capacity of a 
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developing country to benefit from FDI flows were present even before the on set of 
globalisation, they assumed more complexity and importance since globalisation.   It 
is also clear that globalisation has constrained natio  states and their ability or 
willingness to influence multinational corporations, and their autonomy has declined 
significantly.   
 
This in turn has led to the emergence of new actors b th at national and global level 
such as protest movements, campaign groups and non-government organisations.  
Their emergence in turn led to new governance mechanisms to restrain and make 
corporations accountable such as corporate social responsibility.   
 
What becomes clear is that although models such as NIS are helpful in understanding 
the process of knowledge and technology accumulation, the traditional variants do not 
capture the all aspects of this process (both internal at national level and external at 
international level) that is increasingly becoming complex due to globalisation of 
finance capital, production, trade, research and development, information flow and 
commodification of science knowledge.  The conceptual model introduced here 





Factors/ Problems Affecting the Sceince KnowledgeProduction/ 
Formation, Control, and Use
 
Increasing Commodification, Privatisation, Migration and Displacement of Skilled Jobs 
State regulators' closer relationship with corporations,


















National Innovation Systems 
(NISs)
Developing Countries:
National Innovation Systems 
(NISs)
Factors/ Problems Affecting the Sceince KnowledgeProduction/ 
Formation, Control, and Use
 
Increasing Commodification, Privatisation, Migration of skills,  State's inability to to 
regulate and influence MNCs, Complexities involved in benefiting from FDI technical 
spin offs and foreignR&D investmens, and New Governance Mechanisms such as 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Knowledge Capital Accumulation
 
Figure 6: Knowledge Capital in Globalised World: New Conceptual Model
Source: Authors
 
 6. Some Conclusions 
At the outset, this paper argued that the commodificat on of scientific knowledge 
production and globalisation demands exploration of a new conceptual model of 
national innovation systems to aid understanding of knowledge formation and 
innovation.  
 
We have demonstrated how, in the last two decades, various institutional and funding 
changes in the public R&D system in many developed countries have led to the 
commodification of scientific knowledge. That is, science knowledge production and 
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ownership have undergone a fundamental shift of socio-e onomic location.  The 
traditional and commodification models of science pr sented in this paper illustrate 
this development.  The significant and effective privatisation of scientific knowledge 
is an important development in national systems of innovation.  
 
Commodification led in turn to public scepticism and even hostility towards science 
which sometimes is expressed through public protests in various forms, such as  
controversies over GM food and crops, HIV/AIDS drugs, and intellectual property 
rights (Baskaran and Boden forthcoming).  Such opposition similarly impacts on 
governments’ ability to regulate the national system of innovation. 
 
Nation states’ ability to control, regulate, and manage all aspects of economic 
activities including science knowledge production ad  transfers have also been 
constrained by globalisation, which has engendered fast-flows of financial capital, 
trade, information, skills, jobs, and knowledge capital.  Globalisation has had a 
differential impact on the national systems of innovation not only withiin developed 
and developing countries, but also among developed and developing countries.   In 
other words they are not uniform across countries.  This is evident from the 
differences in migration of skilled jobs, skills, and knowledge formation and 
technology spillovers through FDI, and the impact of intellectual property regime 
(WTO/TRIPS).   
 
Increasingly, nation states’ autonomy to manage their economic affairs including 
knowledge capital formation and their ability to influence multinational actors such as 
MNCs are being eroded.  Non-state actors such as protest movements, campaign 
groups, and NGOs have emerged both at national and international level as counter 
weights to offset the loss of autonomy by the national states.  They started putting 
pressure on nation states and multinational organisations including MNCs which has 
led to new governance mechanisms such as corporate social responsibility.   
 
These developments demand a new model beyond the NIS approach to understand the 
formation and flow of knowledge capital in the globalised world.   In this paper we 
have identified that the architecture of such a model has three major actors: (i) 
National interests and stakeholders (because science takes place on a national stage) 
who may act with others in international contexts (such as protest movement); (ii) 
Globalised corporate interests (as the organisations that carry scientific knowledge 
activity); and (iii) Supra-national organisations that seek to regulate/control globalised 
and national interests.  The nature and the degree of inter linkages between these three 
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